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Abstract
We prove the existence of approximate correlated equilibrium of support
size polylogarithmic in the number of players and the number of actions per
player. In particular, using the probabilistic method, we show that there exists
a multiset of polylogarithmic size such that the uniform distribution over this
multiset forms an approximate correlated equilibrium. Along similar lines,
we establish the existence of approximate coarse correlated equilibrium with
logarithmic support.
We complement these results by considering the computational complexity
of determining small-support approximate equilibria. We show that random
sampling can be used to efficiently determine an approximate coarse corre-
lated equilibrium with logarithmic support. But, such a tight result does not
hold for correlated equilibrium, i.e., sampling might generate an approximate
correlated equilibrium of support size Ω(m) where m is the number of actions
per player. Finally, we show that finding an exact correlated equilibrium with
smallest possible support is NP-hard under Cook reductions, even in the case
of two-player zero-sum games.
1 Introduction
Equilibria are central solution concepts in the theory of strategic games. Arguably
the most prominent examples of such notions of rationality are Nash equilibrium [17],
correlated equilibrium [2, 3], and coarse correlated equilibrium [10]. At a high level,
these concepts denote distributions over players’ strategy profiles where no player
can benefit, in expectation, by unilateral deviation. Equilibria are used to model the
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outcomes of interaction between strategic human players, and between organizations
run by human agents. Hence, if a solution concept is too complicated (say, on
account of the fact that it requires randomization over a large set of strategy profiles)
then its applicability is debatable, simply because it is hard to imagine that human
players would adopt highly intricate strategies. Such concerns have been raised in
the context of bounded rationality, see, e.g., [21] and [20]. Therefore, studying the
simplicity of these solution concepts is of fundamental importance.
A natural measure of simplicity of equilibrium is the size of its support, i.e., the
total number of strategy profiles played with nonzero probability. Support size is
a pragmatic notion of simplicity, since equilibria with large support size are hard
to implement and unlikely to be adopted by human players. This was pointed out
early on by Lipton et al. [16] where they proved the existence of small-support
approximate1 Nash equilibria by generalizing the work of Altho¨fer [1].
In this paper we extend this line of work and establish bounds on the support
size of approximate correlated equilibrium and approximate coarse correlated equi-
librium in large games; specifically, games with n players and m actions per player.
The total number of strategy profiles in a game with n players and m actions per
player is mn, hence the support size of an equilibrium can be as large as mn. But,
both exact coarse correlated equilibria and exact correlated equilibria are relatively
simple solution concepts in terms of their support size. Since correlated equilibria
can be specified by nm(m− 1) linear inequalities (see Section 2 for details; specifi-
cally, consider the definition in Remark 1 with ε = 0 in inequality (1)) there exists
a correlated equilibrium with support of size O(nm2) (this support-size bound for
exact correlated equilibrium appears in [9]). Using similar arguments, we can show
that there exists a coarse correlated equilibrium with support size O(nm), because
they are defined by nm linear inequalities (see Definition 1). Examples 2, 3, and 4
in Appendix A show that these bounds are almost tight.
But what if we are interested in approximate correlated equilibrium or approx-
imate coarse correlated equilibrium? Can the tight poly(n,m) bounds be signifi-
cantly improved? In this paper we show that the answer is yes. For both coarse
correlated equilibrium (see Theorem 1) and correlated equilibrium (see Theorem
2) we prove that in any n-player m-action game, for any fixed ε, there exists an
ε-approximate equilibrium with support size poly(logm, log n). In fact, the small-
support equilibrium, whose existence we establish, is just a uniform distribution
(over a multiset of size poly(logm, log n)), and hence it has a very simple structure.
Small-support approximate Nash equilibria have been considered in [1], [16], [13],
1An ε-approximate equilibrium, where ε > 0, is a distribution over strategy profiles at which
no player has more than an ε incentive to deviate.
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[6], and [4]. The best known support-size bound for approximate Nash equilibrium
is established in [4], wherein they prove the existence of an approximate Nash equi-
librium in which each player uses a mixed strategy (i.e., a distribution over her
actions) of support size O(logn+logm). Since Nash equilibrium, by definition, is a
product of independent distributions (one for each player), this implies the existence
of an approximate Nash equilibrium with overall support size O((logn + logm)n).
For the case of approximate correlated equilibrium in two player games (n = 2)
this bound coincides with our upper bound of Theorem 2. In all the other cases,
i.e., coarse correlated equilibrium and correlated equilibrium with more than two
players, the results developed in this paper exponentially improve upon this bound
(see Table 1).
ε-Approximate Equilibrium Support Size
Nash O
((
logn+logm−log ε
ε2
)n)
[4]
Correlated O
(
logm(logm+logn−log ε)
ε4
)
[current paper]
Coarse Correlated O
(
logm+log n
ε2
)
[current paper]
Table 1: The existence results. In every n-player m-action game there exists an ε-
approximate equilibrium whose support size is upper bounded by the corresponding
entry in the second column.
Beyond existence, we also consider computational issues related to small-support
approximate equilibria. For any fixed ε, we present polynomial-time algorithms for
computing ε-approximate coarse correlated equilibrium of support size O(logm +
log n) and approximate correlated equilibrium of support size O(m logm + log n).
We also prove that finding an exact correlated equilibrium with smallest possible
support is NP-hard under Cook reductions (see Appendix B).
2 Preliminaries
We consider n-player m-action games, i.e., games with n players and m actions
per player.2 We use the following standard notation. The set of players is [n] =
{1, 2, ..., n} and the set of actions for any player i ∈ [n] is Ai = [m] = {1, 2, ..., m}.
The set of strategy profiles is A = [m]n. Let (ai, a−i) denote a strategy profile
2All the results in the paper also generalize to the case where each player has a different number
of actions, i.e., player i has mi actions. For ease of exposition, we assume throughout that all the
players have the same number of actions m.
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in which ai is the action of the ith player and a−i denotes the strategies chosen by
players other than i. Players’ utilities are normalized between 0 and 1; in particular,
the payoff function of player i is ui : A→ [0, 1]. The set of probability distributions
over a set B is denoted by ∆(B). The payoff function can be multilinearly extended
to ui : ∆(A) → [0, 1]. That is, for probability distribution x ∈ ∆(A), write ui(x) to
denote the expected payoff of player i under x.
A distribution x ∈ ∆(A) is called k-uniform if it is the uniform distribution
over a size-k multiset of strategy profiles. Note that the size of the support of any
k-uniform distribution is at most k.
At a high level, the idea behind the notions of correlated equilibrium (CE) and
coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) is the following. Players implement some distri-
bution x ∈ ∆(A), which is not necessarily a product distribution. We can interpret
such a correlated implementation in terms of a mediator that randomizes according
to the distribution x, i.e., draws an action profile a = (ai)i∈[n] from x. Then the
mediator (privately) tells to every player i the corresponding action ai. We will call
the drawn action ai the recommendation to player i.
A distribution x ∈ ∆(A) is an ε-coarse correlated equilibrium3 if no player can
gain more than ε by switching to a single pure action j ∈ Ai instead of following
the recommendation of the mediator.
In addition, we say that a distribution x ∈ ∆(A) is an ε-correlated equilibrium
if no player can gain more than ε by following any switching rule f : Ai → Ai (i.e.,
by switching from the recommended action ai to some other action f(ai)).
More formally, we have the following definitions.
Definition 1. Write Rij(a) := ui(j, a−i)− ui(a) to denote the regret of player i for
not playing j at strategy profile a. A distribution x ∈ ∆(A) is an ε-coarse correlated
equilibrium (ε-CCE) if Ea∼x[R
i
j(a)] ≤ ε for every player i and every action j ∈ Ai.
Definition 2. Write Rif (a) := ui(f(ai), a−i) − ui(a) to denote the regret of player
i for not implementing the switching rule f at strategy profile a. A distribution
x ∈ ∆(A) is an ε-correlated equilibrium (ε-CE) if Ea∼x[R
i
f (a)] ≤ ε for every player
i and every mapping f : Ai → Ai.
Note that if in the above definitions we set ε = 0, then we obtain the concepts
of (exact) coarse correlated and correlated equilibrium.
Remark 1. There is another common definition of ε-correlated equilibrium (see,
e.g., [12]) which requires that no player can gain more than ε by changing a single
3The set of coarse correlated equilibria is sometimes called the Hannan set, see, e.g., [23].
4
recommendation, ai, to another action j. Formally,∑
a
−i∈A−i
(ui(j, a−i)− ui(ai, a−i))x(ai, a−i) ≤ ε (1)
for every player i and every pair of actions ai, j ∈ Ai.
For an exact correlated equilibrium (i.e., with ε = 0) these inequalities are satis-
fied if and only if Definition 2 holds (again with ε = 0). But, for ε > 0, this definition
is not equivalent to Definition 2 of ε-CE. We argue that this definition is vacuous
when the number of actions per player, m, is large and ε is a constant. To see this
consider, for example, the uniform distribution x over the k actions {(j, j, ..., j)j∈[k]},
where 1/ε ≤ k ≤ m. According to this definition x is a 1/k-correlated equilibrium,
irrespective of the payoff function. This is because the marginal probability of every
action ai (i.e.,
∑
a
−i
x(ai, a−i)) is at most 1/k and the utilities are between 0 and 1.
3 Coarse Correlated Equilibrium
As a warm-up to the correlated equilibrium case, we first prove the existence of
small-support ε-CCE.
3.1 Existence
Theorem 1. Every n-player m-action game admits a k-uniform ε-coarse correlated
equilibrium for all
k >
⌊
2(lnm+ lnn)
ε2
⌋
(2)
Proof. The proof is based on the probabilistic method. Let σ ∈ ∆(A) be an exact
coarse correlated equilibrium of the game; i.e., we have Ea∼σ[R
i
j(a)] ≤ 0 for every
player i and every action j ∈ Ai. We sample k action profiles a(1), a(2), ..., a(k) ∈ A
independently at random according to the distribution σ. Denote by s the uniform
distribution over a(1), a(2), ..., a(k).
Note that, for any player i and action j, Rij(a) with a ∼ σ is a random variable
that takes a value between −1 and 1 (since the utilities of players are between 0 and
1), and Ea∼σ[R
i
j(a)] ≤ 0. Therefore by Hoeffding’s inequality (see [14]) we have
Pr
a(1),...,a(k)∼σ
(
Ea∼s[R
i
j(a)] ≥ ε
)
= Pr

1
k
∑
ℓ∈[k]
Rij(a(ℓ)) ≥ ε

 ≤ e− kε22 . (3)
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For player i and action j, write Ei,j to denote the event: Ea∼s[R
i
j(a)] ≥ ε (equiv-
alently, 1
k
∑
ℓ∈[k]R
i
j(a(ℓ)) ≥ ε). Inequality (3) implies that for k >
⌊
2(logm+logn)
ε2
⌋
we have Pr(Ei,j) <
1
nm
. Note that there are nm such events, one for every player
i ∈ [n] and action j ∈ [m]. Therefore, via the union bound, we get that with positive
probability none of these events will happen; implying that the sampled distribution
s is an ε-CCE.
3.2 Computation
The following proposition shows that not only can we prove the existence an ε-CCE
with logarithmic support size, but we can efficiently determine it as well.
Proposition 1. There exists a polynomial (in n and m) time randomized algorithm
for computing k-uniform ε-coarse correlated equilibrium for
k >
⌊
2(lnm+ lnn + ln 2)
ε2
⌋
(4)
Proof. If we set k >
⌊
2(lnm+lnn+ln 2)
ε2
⌋
in inequality (3) then the following holds:
Pr(Ea∼s[R
i
j(a)] ≥ ε) <
1
2nm
. This implies that the sampled distribution is an ε-CCE
with probability at least 1/2.
Note that in multi-player games a coarse correlated equilibrium can be efficiently
determined. In particular, we can compute a correlated equilibrium in polynomial
time using the algorithm4 of Jiang and Leyton-Brown [15] (see also [19]). We can
then treat the computed correlated equilibrium as a coarse correlated equilibrium.
Now our randomized algorithm is direct, it starts with a coarse correlated equi-
librium σ and then it samples k pure action profiles according to σ. Finally, the
algorithm checks whether the uniform distribution over the samples forms an ε-CCE
or not. If not, then it samples (k action profiles) again. In expectation, after two
sampling iterations the algorithm will find an ε-CCE.
4This algorithm requires the game to be succinct—equivalently, a black box that can compute
expected utilities under given product distributions (see [15] and [19] for details). If the game is not
succinct (i.e., such a black box does not exist), then as an alternative we can use regret-minimizing
dynamics, e.g., regret matching [11], to efficiently compute an approximate CE. Starting form an
approximate CE, say with approximation guarantee ε/2, instead of an exact CE will worsen the
support-size guarantee by at most a constant factor.
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4 Correlated Equilibrium
In this section we establish the existence of an ε-CE with polylogarithmic sup-
port size. Note that in Definition 2, an ε-CE is specified via nmm inequalities
of the form Ea∼x[R
i
f (a)] ≤ ε, one for every i ∈ [n] and f : Ai → Ai. Hence
simply applying the probabilistic method, as in the case of coarse correlated equi-
librium, will not give us the desired polylogarithmic bound. In particular, sampling
from an arbitrary correlated equilibrium leads to a support-size guarantee of about
log(nmm) = m logm+ log n. We get around this issue (see Proof of Theorem 2 for
details) by sampling from a particular approximate Nash equilibrium for which we
only have to consider nm(log n+logm) inequalities.
4.1 Existence
Theorem 2. Every n-player m-action game admits a k-uniform ε-correlated equi-
librium for all
k ≥
⌊
264 lnm(lnm+ lnn− ln ε+ ln 16)
ε4
⌋
= O
(
logm(logm+ logn− log ε)
ε4
)
(5)
Proof. Let σ ∈ ∆(A) be a distribution in which every player i plays actions only
from a subset Bi ⊆ Ai; i.e., σ(a) > 0 implies ai ∈ Bi. Then σ is an ε-CE iff
Ea∼σ[R
i
f(a)] ≤ ε for every switching rule f : Bi → Ai. In other words, we can
consider only switching rules f : Bi → Ai instead of f : Ai → Ai, because all the
recommendations to player i will be in the set Bi. Note that, given a player i and
subset Bi ⊆ Ai, there are m
|Bi| switching rules of the form f : Bi → Ai.
In Definition 2 there are nmm inequalities (Ea∼σ[R
i
f (a)] ≤ ε), one for every i ∈ [n]
and mapping f : Ai → Ai. To avoid dealing with all these nm
m inequalities, we start
with an approximate correlated equilibrium σ in which every player plays actions
from a small subset, i.e., the sets Bi for σ are of small cardinality. Then, by the above
argument, the number of switching rules (in other words, the number of inequalities
of the form Ea∼σ[R
i
f (a)] ≤ ε) that we need to consider will be significantly smaller
than nmm. Existence of an approximate correlated equilibrium wherein each player
uses only a small subset of her actions follows from a result in [4].
Theorem 1 in [4] shows that in any n-player m-action game there exists an (ε/2)-
approximate Nash equilibrium σ = Πiσi in which each player uses a mixed strategy
with support size at most b where b =
⌈
32(lnn+lnm−lnε+ln16)
ε2
⌉
. That is, |supp(σi)| ≤ b
for all i. Since σ is an (ε/2)-Nash equilibrium it is an (ε/2)-CE as well. In addition,
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here, the set Bi is equal to the support of player i’s mixed strategy. Therefore, we
have |Bi| ≤ b for all i.
We now apply the probabilistic method. We sample k action profiles a(1), a(2), ..., a(k) ∈
A independently at random according to the distribution σ and denote by s the
uniform distribution over the samples. For every player i and a switching rule
f : Bi → Ai, the regret R
i
f(a), with a ∼ σ, is a random variable that takes a value
in [−1, 1] and satisfies: Ea∼σ[R
i
f (a)] ≤ ε/2.
Therefore by Hoeffding’s inequality (see [14]) we have
Pr
(
Ea∼s[R
i
f (a)] ≥ ε
)
= Pr

1
k
∑
ℓ∈[k]
Rif (a(ℓ)) ≥ ε

 ≤ e− kε28 . (6)
Setting k >
⌊
264 lnm(lnn+lnm−ln ε+ln16)
ε4
⌋
guarantees that Pr(Ea∼s[R
i
f (a)] ≥ ε) <
1
nmb
.
Since we have at most nmb such events (one for every player i ∈ [n] and every
switching rule f : Bi → [m]), union bound implies that with positive probability
none of them will happen. Therefore, with positive probability, s is an ε-CE.
4.2 Computation
Unlike the coarse correlated equilibrium case, there is no guarantee that sampling an
arbitrary correlated equilibrium polylogarithmic many times will generate an ε-CE
with small support. This is because in the proof of Theorem 2 we sampled from
a very specific approximate equilibrium; in particular, an approximate correlated
equilibrium in which every player uses at most O
(
logn+logm−log ε
ε4
)
strategies. We
do not know whether such an approximate correlated equilibrium can be computed
in polynomial time. Nevertheless, we are able to compute ε-CE with support size
O
(
m logm+logn
ε2
)
, because O
(
m logm+logn
ε2
)
samples from any correlated equilibrium
are enough to form an approximate correlated equilibrium. This algorithm improves
upon the know results of [15] and [12] that respectively generate an exact and
approximate correlated equilibrium with support size O(nm2).
Proposition 2. There exists a polynomial (in n and m) time randomized algorithm
for computing k-uniform ε-correlated equilibrium for
k >
⌊
2(m lnm+ lnn + ln 2)
ε2
⌋
. (7)
Proof. Let σ be a correlated equilibrium. If we sample k pure action profiles ac-
cording to the distribution σ then we have
Pr(Ea∼s[R
i
f(a)] ≥ ε) ≤ e
− kε
2
2 ≤
1
2nmm
. (8)
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for every switching rule f : Ai → Ai of every player i. Therefore, with probability
at least 1/2 the uniform distribution over the k samples forms an ε-CE.
Now the algorithm is straightforward. First compute a correlated equilibrium
(for example, using the algorithm from [15]), then sample O
(
m logm+log n
ε2
)
actions
until the empirical distribution forms an ε-CE.5
The following example demonstrates that if we sample from an arbitrary corre-
lated equilibrium, then in fact we may need O(m) (and not logarithmic) samples to
obtain an ε-CE.
Example 1. Consider two-player matching-pennies game where in addition to the
standard real actions, ri ∈ {−1, 1}, the two players also choose a dummy num-
ber di ∈ [m] that is irrelevant for the payoffs. Formally, the action set of each
player i ∈ [2] is {(ri, di) : ri ∈ {−1, 1} and di ∈ [m]}. The payoffs are given by
u1((ri, di)i=1,2) = r1r2 = −u2((ri, di)i=1,2).
Consider the following correlated equilibrium of the game. First we select a
d ∈ [m] uniformly at random, and then set r1, and independently r2, to be 1 or −1
with equal probability. Note that, for any d ∈ [m], if we sample from this distribution
then the probability that drawn action profile contains d—i.e., the drawn action
profile is of the form ((ri, d)i=1,2))—is equal to 1/m.
Now, if we sample m strategy profiles from this distribution, then for any
d ∈ [m] the probability that it is picked exactly once during the sampling is
m 1
m
·
(
1− 1
m
)m−1
≈ 1
e
. If a certain d was picked exactly once then both players
can deduce from d which action their opponent will play. Note that the expected
number of d ∈ [m] that are sampled exactly once is m
e
. Moreover, the probability
that the number of exactly-once-sampled d’s will be smaller than m
2e
is exponentially
small in m (see , e.g., Lemma 4 in [5]). So, with probability exponentially close to
1, in the resulting uniform distribution at least one player may increase her payoff
by at least 1
4e
by reacting optimally to the opponent’s known strategy in all cases in
which she got the recommendation (ri, d), where d was chosen exactly once. There-
fore with exponentially high probability the samples does not induce an ε-CE for
ε < 1
4e
.
5We can test in polynomial time whether a distribution with polynomial support size, say x,
is an ε-CE or not. Specifically, for every player i and each action ai ∈ [m] we can first determine
a′i ∈ [m] that maximizes
∑
a
−i:x(ai,a−i)>0
(ui(a
′
i, a−i)− ui(ai, a−i))x(ai, a−i). Then, set f(ai) = a
′
i
and verify that Ea∼x[R
i
f (a)] ≤ ε.
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5 Discussion
Having established polylogarithmic bounds on the support size of approximate cor-
related equilibrium and approximate coarse correlated equilibrium, it is natural to
ask whether these bounds are tight.
Altho¨fer [1] gave an example of a two-players m-action zero-sum game where
the support of every approximate optimal strategy of one of the players is at least
Ω(logm). By considering the same game in the context of coarse correlated equilib-
rium (or correlated equilibrium) we can deduce that for every approximate coarse
correlated equilibrium (or approximate correlated equilibrium) in the game the sup-
port size is at least Ω(logm). Therefore, in the bound of Theorem 1 the logm term
is tight. In addition, the log2m term is almost tight in Theorem 2.
On the other hand, the exact dependence of the support size of approximate
equilibrium on the number of players, n, remains open. To pinpoint this question,
we consider n-player 2-action games (where the set of approximate correlated equi-
libria coincides with the set of approximate coarse correlated equilibria) and ask the
following questions:
Open Question 1: Does there exist a family of n-player 2-action games {Γn}
∞
n=1
along with constants c and ε, such that for every ε-CE in Γn the support size is at
least c logn?
A positive answer to this question will mean that the logn term in Theorems 1
and 2 is tight.
Open Question 2: Does there exist a function s(ε) (s does not depend on n),
such that every n-player 2-action game admits an ε-CE with support size at most
s(ε)?
A positive answer to this question will mean that the support size of an approx-
imate equilibrium can be independent of n.
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A Tightness of the bound by Germano and Lu-
gosi [9]
In a n-playerm-action game with strategy space A, correlated equilibria are specified
by nm(m−1) linear inequalities in the affine space ∆(A). Using this fact, Germano
and Lugosi [9] proved the existence of a correlated equilibrium with support of size
nm(m−1)+1. Along similar lines we can show that the exists a of coarse correlated
equilibrium of support size nm+ 1.
The following example demonstrates that an m2 term must exist in the support-
size bound for exact correlated equilibrium.
Example 2. There exists a two-player m-actions game with unique correlated equi-
librium where each player randomizes uniformly over all her m actions. This game is
a m-action generalization of the rock-paper-scissors game, and it is presented in [18]
and [22]. The support of the unique correlated equilibrium in this game is m2.
The following example demonstrates that a factor of m is unavoidable in the
O(nm) bound for exact coarse correlated equilibrium.
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Example 3. Consider the following two-player m-actions zero sum game where
player 1 tries to match player 2, and player 2 tries to miss match.
u1(a, b) =
{
1 if a = b
0 otherwise.
The payoff of player 2 is defined by u2(a, b) = −u1(a, b). In this game player 1
can guarantee the value 1/m by playing uniformly over all her actions. For every
distribution over A with support of size less than m player 2 can get a payoff of 0
by playing pure strategy. Therefore, a coarse correlated equilibrium of size less than
m does not exist.
Next we construct a game in which the support size of any coarse correlated, and
hence correlated, equilibrium is at least n. This shows that a factor of n is unavoid-
able in the support-size bound for correlated and coarse correlated equilibrium. We
will need the following proposition in order to establish the claim.
Proposition 3. Let P = {pj}j∈[k] be a set of positive reals (pj > 0) that can
generate all the values in {2−i}i∈[n] as partial sums; i.e., there exist subsets of indexes
{Bi}i∈[n] such that
∑
j∈Bi
pj = 2
−i. Then k ≥ n.
Proof. By multiplying all the elements in P by 2n, we have the following equivalent
claim that we establish below. Let P = {pj}j∈[k] be a set of positive reals that can
generate all the values in {2i−1}i∈[n] as partial sums, then k ≥ n.
We prove by induction that for i ≤ n there must be at least i elements in P that
are less than or equal to 2i−1. This statement for i completes the proof.
For i = 1, we need a partial sum equal to 1. Therefore, in P ,there must be an
element p ≤ 1.
For i + 1, by induction we know that there exist i elements, say p1, p2, ..., pi,
that satisfy pj ≤ 2
j−1. If we sum these elements we have
∑
j∈[i] pj ≤ 2
i − 1 < 2i.
Therefore, in order to have 2i as a partial sum, there must be at least one additional
element that satisfies pi+1 < 2
i.
Example 4. We construct a 2n-player 2-action game in which the support size of
any correlated equilibrium is at least n.. In 2-action games the set of correlated
equilibria and coarse correlated equilibria coincide. Therefore the example holds for
both solution concepts.
First note the 2-player 2-action zero-sum game, with v > 0, shown in Figure 1
has a unique correlated equilibrium, which is the Nash equilibrium, wherein both
players play the mixed strategy ( 1
v+1
, v
v+1
).
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1 2
1 v,−v 0, 0
2 0, 0 1,−1
Figure 1: A 2-player 2-action game with unique correlated equilibrium
Now consider n pairs of players (Ri, Ci)i∈[n] who play the above game with dif-
ferent parameters vi, i.e., for all i, we replace v in the above game by vi. Here, the
payoffs of players Ri and Ci do not depend on the actions of players Rj and Cj for
j 6= i.
Correlated equilibria of this game can be characterized as follows: x is a cor-
related equilibrium iff, for all i, the marginals of the pairs of strategies of players
(Ri, Ci) is exactly
1 2
1 1
(vi+1)2
vi
(vi+1)2
2 vi
(vi+1)2
v2
i
(vi+1)2
That is, the marginals form the unique correlated equilibrium of the game be-
tween players Ri and Ci. In particular, the marginals over the strategies of player
Ri are
(
1
vi+1
, vi
vi+1
)
.
Note that, by definition, marginals are (partial) sums of probabilities
∑
a∈B x(a)
with B ⊂ supp(x). Set vi = 2
i − 1, then for any correlated equilibrium, x, we
can take partial sums of the probabilities of strategy profiles in supp(x) to generate
all values in
{
1
vi+1
}
i∈[n]
= {2−i}i∈[n]. Therefore, by Proposition 3, supp(x) must
contain at least n elements.
B Hardness Result
We prove that finding a correlated equilibrium with smallest possible support is
NP-hard under Cook reductions, even in two-player zero-sum games. To accomplish
this we first show that in a two-player zero-sum game finding a Nash equilibrium
with minimum support size is NP-Hard. Then, we use a correspondence between
correlated equilibria and Nash equilibria in two-player zero-sum games to obtain the
result.
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A sparsest Nash equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium with minimum support size.
In the following lemma we reduce exact cover by 3 sets, a problem known to be
NP-hard (see [8]), to the problem of finding a sparsest Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 1. Given a two-player zero-sum game, finding a sparsest Nash equilibrium
is NP-hard under Cook reductions.
Proof. In the exact cover by 3 sets problem (X3C) we are given a universe of elements
J and a collection, I = {Si}i∈[m], of 3-element subsets of J and the goal is to
determine if there an exact cover of J , i.e., a subcollection I ′ ⊆ I such that every
element of J is contained in exactly one member of I ′. At a high level, given an
X3C instance, we construct a two-player zero-sum game in which the first player
picks a set in the collection I and the second player picks an element from J . The
goal of the first player is to select a set that covers the second player’s element
and, since it is a zero-sum game, the second player wants to avoid getting covered.
Formally, the action sets of the players are [m] and [n] respectively, where n = |J |
and the utilities are as follows: u1(i, j) = −u2(i, j) = 1 if j ∈ Si, else if j /∈ Si,
u1(i, j) = −u2(i, j) = −1.
Write (σ∗1, σ
∗
2) to denote a sparsest Nash equilibrium of the game. Here σ
∗
1 and
σ∗2 are the mixed strategies of the first and second player respectively. Below we
prove that |supp(σ∗1)| = n/3 iff the given X3C instance has an exact cover. Hence
if we are given a sparsest Nash equilibrium we can efficiently determine (by looking
at the support size of the mixed strategy of the first player) whether the given X3C
instance has an exact cover or not. This completes the reduction.
We assume that for all j ∈ J there exists a set Si ∈ I such that j ∈ Si, else
the problem is trivial. Therefore, the value of the game is positive: player one can
guarantee a payoff of at least 1/m by playing the uniform distribution over [m].
Since the value of the game is positive, the second player receives a negative payoff
at any Nash equilibrium. Using this we can show that for any Nash equilibrium
(σ1, σ2) the sets whose index is in the support of σ1 cover J : ∪i∈supp(σ1)Si = J . If this
is not the case, i.e., there exists an element j ∈ J that is not covered by ∪i∈supp(σ1)Si,
then the second player can play the pure action corresponding to j and get a payoff
of 1, which contradicts the fact that the second player receives a negative payoff at
any Nash equilibrium.
Note that the subsets in I are of cardinality three, therefore any cover of J must
contain at least n/3 subsets. This implies that |supp(σ∗1)| ≥ n/3. This inequality
holds regardless of the existence of an exact cover. In particular, if the X3C instance
does not have an exact cover then |supp(σ∗1)| > n/3.
On the other hand, if the given X3C instance has an exact cover then |supp(σ∗1)| =
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n/3. To show this we first consider the following Nash equilibrium: the mixed strat-
egy of the first player is the uniform distribution over the exact cover and the mixed
strategy of the second player is the uniform distribution over [n]. Since in two-player
zero-sum games mixed strategies of Nash equilibria are interchangeable, we get that
|supp(σ∗1)| = n/3. Overall, this establishes the desired claim that |supp(σ
∗
1)| = n/3
iff the X3C instance has an exact cover.
Note that in a two-player zero-sum game, (σ1, σ2) is a Nash equilibrium iff
the mixed strategies σ1 and σ2 are optimal strategies
6 of the two players. Hence,
Lemma 1 implies that finding a sparsest optimal strategy, say for the first player, is
NP-hard.
We now prove the hardness of finding a sparsest (i.e., one with minimum support
size) correlated equilibrium.
Theorem 3. Given a two-player zero-sum game, finding a sparsest correlated equi-
librium is NP-hard under Cook reductions.
Proof. Let π be a correlated equilibrium of a two-player zero-sum game. It is shown
in [7] that for any action a2 of the second player such that π(a2) > 0 (i.e., a2 is played
with positive probability), the conditional probability distribution π | a2 over the
first player’s actions is an optimal strategy for the first player. We have the same
result for actions a1 of the first player (with π(a1) > 0) and conditional probability
distribution π | a1. Therefore, (π | a2, π | a1) is a Nash equilibrium.
Write π∗ to denote a sparsest correlated equilibrium of the given game. Also,
let σ∗ = (σ∗1, σ
∗
2) be a sparsest Nash equilibrium of the game and ri = |supp(σ
∗
i )| for
i ∈ {1, 2}. Since σ∗ is a correlated equilibrium as well, we have
|supp(π∗)| ≤ r1r2. (9)
In two-player zero-sum games mixed strategies of Nash equilibria are interchange-
able; therefore, for any Nash equilibria of the game, (σ1, σ2), we have |supp(σ1)| ≥ r1
and |supp(σ2)| ≥ r2. In particular, |supp(π
∗ | a2)| ≥ r1 and |supp(π
∗ | a1)| ≥ r2 for
any two actions a1 and a2 that are played with positive probability. Therefore, in-
equality (9) is tight and we have |supp(π∗ | a2)| = r1 along with |supp(π
∗ | a1)| = r2.
The above stated property implies that, given π∗, we can efficiently determine a
sparsest Nash equilibrium. In particular, let a1 (a2) be an action of the first (second)
player such that π∗(a1) > 0 (π
∗(a2) > 0), then (π
∗ | a2, π
∗ | a1) is a sparsest Nash
equilibrium. Overall, using Lemma 1 we get the desired result.
6We work with the standard maxmin definition of optimal strategies. Specifically, σi is said to
be an optimal strategy for player i if it satisfies: σi ∈ argmaxxi∈∆([m])minx−i∈∆([m]) ui(xi, x−i).
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